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GRAND JURY PROCEEDINGS: A
BROADENING OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION
United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Williams, I the United States Supreme Court
held that courts may not dismiss indictments when the prosecution
fails to present substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.
2
In doing so, the Court emphasized the historical independence
of the grand jury and reasoned that judicial intervention would hin-
der the grand jury's effectiveness as an investigative body.3 The
Court also held that certiorari could be granted even though the
question presented was neither pressed nor passed upon below.
4
According to the Court, review was justified because the United
States had also been a litigant in an earlier case which the lower
courts used as precedent in Williams.5
This Note examines the Court's decision and concludes that the
Court placed too much emphasis on the historical independence of
the grand jury. Such emphasis ignored recent changes in the grand
jury system and the role the grand jury plays in protecting citizens
from wrongful prosecution. This Note also suggests that the "sub-
stantial exculpatory evidence" rule, set forth in United States v. Page
6
and argued for inJustice Stevens' dissent, better balances the inter-
ests promoted by the investigatory and protective functions of the
grand jury. Finally, this Note concludes that the Court's expanded
powers of review may unduly favor the government. The ultimate
1 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992).
2 Id. at 1741-46.
3 Id. at 1742.
4 Id. at 1740-41.
5 Id.
6 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987).
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effect of this expansion will depend upon whether the Court grants
review of similar cases in the future, and how it rules in each of these
future cases. Even if the rule does not result in actual bias, however,
it does display an undesirable appearance of unfairness.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE BROAD POWERS OF THE GRAND JURY
Historically, the grand jury has enjoyed broad investigatory
powers and freedom from procedural rules.7 The Supreme Court
recognizes the grand jury's independence and has consistently lim-
ited judicial interference with grand jury activities."
In Hale v. Henkel,9 the Court determined that a grand jury could
conduct an investigation into the commission of a crime without a
formal charge.' 0 The historical independence of the grand jury in-
dicated to the Court that the grand jury possesses the power to act
on its own volition.II Furthermore, the Court noted, the large ma-
jority of state courts support such broad investigatory powers. 12
However, by holding that the grand jury may not undertake an in-
vestigative action "far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as
reasonable," the Hale Court did place loose limits on the grand
jury's investigative power.' 3
After Hale, the Court held in a series of cases that certain evi-
dentiary and procedural rules do not apply in the grand jury con-
text. In Costello v. United States,14 the Court acknowledged the
7 For information regarding the historical independence of the grand jury, see Hale
v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); GEORGEJ. EDWARDS,JR., THE GRANDJURY, 28-32 (1906);
1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE &JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 8.2 (1984).
8 Hale, 201 U.S. at 60; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); United States
v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 339 (1974); United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66 (1986); Bank
of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
9 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
10 Id. at 59-60. In Hale, the grand jury issued Hale a subpoena duces tecum. Id. at
66, 70. Despite being offered immunity from criminal charges, Hale refused to answer
questions or produce documents on the grounds that there was no specific charge
against any particular person before the grand jury and that, by answering, he would
tend to incriminate himself. Id. at 59. The Court first held that the investigation was
valid, even absent a formal charge, due to the grand jury's broad investigatory powers.
The grand jury possesses the power to begin investigations based upon its own knowl-
edge or the testimony of a witness. Id. at 65. Second, the Court ruled that Fifth Amend-
ment protections do not apply to grand jury proceedings. Id. at 70. However, the Court
invalidated the subpoena duces tecum because its terms were "far too sweeping to be
regarded as reasonable." Id. at 76.
11 Id. at 60.
12 Id. at 62.
13 Id. at 76.
14 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
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validity of an indictment based solely on hearsay. In upholding the
indictment, the Court reasoned that allowing indictments to be chal-
lenged on the basis of incompetent or inadequate evidence would
greatly delay the justice system.15 Also, such a rule would run
counter to the entire history of the grand jury as an independent
body.16 The Court held that a grand jury indictment, if facially
valid, provides a sufficient base for a trial on the merits and satisfies
the Fifth Amendment's requirement of a grand jury indictment.'
7
Furthermore, the Court commented that courts should not impose
nonconstitutional requirements on the grand jury, such as one re-
garding hearsay, which would invalidate its indictments.
1 8
In United States v. Calandra,19 the Court reaffirmed the broad dis-
cretion allowed in grand jury proceedings by ruling that the Fourth
Amendment's exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury pro-
ceedings. 20 The Court held that a defendant may not refuse to an-
swer a grand jury's questions on the ground that they are based on
unlawfully obtained evidence. 21 Although the protections provided
by the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule clearly existed in a
trial on the merits, the Court held that extending Fourth Amend-
ment protections to grand jury proceedings would hinder the his-
torically independent function of the grand jury.2 2 Also, such an
extension would improperly transform the grand jury into a trial on
15 Id. at 363. In Costello, the grand jury indicted the defendant for wilfully attempting
to evade payment of income taxes. The indictment was based on the testimony of three
government agents who had no firsthand knowledge of the financial transactions they
discussed. Instead, the agents summarized and explained information provided by 144
witnesses who later testified at trial. Id. at 359-60.
16 Id. at 364.
17 Id. at 363. The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall be held to an-
swer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment
of a Grand Jury .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
18 Costello, 350 U.S. at 364.
19 414 U.S. 339 (1974).
20 Id. at 349.
21 Id. In Calandra, federal agents obtained a warrant to search the respondent's place
of business for gambling records and wagering paraphernalia. Id. at 340. Although no
such records or items were found, the agents did uncover records of what were possibly
extortionary payments. Id. at 340-41. The district court determined that no probable
cause existed to justify the warrant and that the search exceeded the scope of the war-
rant. Id. at 342.
22 Id. The Fourth Amendment provides that "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated .... U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Under this rule, the Court
has held that evidence obtained in a manner which violates the fourth amendment can-
not be used against the victim of an unreasonable search and seizure in a criminal pro-




the merits and delay dispensation ofjustice.2 3
Even when there has been a procedural error in a grand jury
investigation, the Court has been reluctant to dismiss a grand jury
indictment. In United States v. Mechanik,24 the Court refused to dis-
miss an indictment solely because testimony before the grand jury
had violated Rule 6(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.2 5
Because of its investigative role, the grand jury has traditionally
been given "wide latitude" in its proceedings, and barring severe
violations a grand jury's indictment will not be dismissed.2 6 Fur-
thermore, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a) states that er-
rors which do not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.2 7 In
that case, the subsequent conviction of the defendants rendered any
error before the grand jury harmless. Furthermore, the Court rea-
soned, reversal of convictions entails substantial costs, delays justice
and, because of the passage of time, may render retrial difficult.
28
B. DISMISSAL OF INDICTMENTS FOR PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
Once a defendant has been indicted by the grand jury, the
courts have only limited ability to dismiss the indictment for
prosecutorial misconduct. In Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States,29
the Court applied the harmless-error rule set forth in Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 52(a)30 to hold that courts may not dismiss
indictments for prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury proceedings
unless such misconduct prejudiced the defendants. 3' In that case,
eight defendants had been indicted on twenty-seven counts of con-
spiracy, mail fraud, tax fraud and obstruction of justice.3 2 On re-
mand for determination of whether prosecutorial misconduct
occurred, the District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed
all twenty-seven counts because prosecutorial misconduct had pre-
23 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 350. See also United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
24 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
25 Id. at 73. Federal Rule Of Criminal Procedure 6(d) states that only certain per-
sons, including "the witness under examination" may be present during grand jury pro-
ceedings. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d). The violation in this case consisted of testimony given
in tandem before the grand jury by two government witnesses. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 73.
26 Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 74 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at
343).
27 Id. at 75. Rule 52(a) provides that "[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance
which does not affect substantial right, shall be disregarded." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
28 Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 72.
29 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
30 See supra note 27 for text of FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
31 Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 254.
32 Id. at 252.
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vented the grand jury from conducting an accurate investigation. 33
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that
the government's misconduct before the grand jury did not warrant
dismissal because "the accumulation of misconduct" did not "sig-
nificantly infringe" on the grand jury's ability to exercise independ-
ent judgment. 34
The Supreme Court affirmed. 35 The Court noted that, because
Congress has empowered the Court to prescribe rules of pleading,
practice and procedure, Rule 52(a) is as binding as statutes enacted
by Congress.3 6 Therefore, federal courts lack the discretion to ig-
33 Id. at 253; United States v. Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. 1324, 1353 (1984), rev'd 821
F.2d 1456 (10th Cir. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S.
250 (1988).
The district court's findings of fact concerning prosecutorial misconduct can be
grouped into ten basic areas. The court first found that the prosecution improperly
appointed three Internal Revenue Service agents as "grand jury agents" when it had no
power to do so and allowed these agents to testify in tandem before the grand jury, in
violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(d). Kilpatrick, 594 F. Supp. at 1328-
30. Second, the court found that the government violated Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 6(e) by delegating its authority before the grand jury to the Internal Revenue
Service agents. Id. at 1331. Third, the court determined that the government was using
the grand jury's powers to obtain information for use in later civil litigation. Id. at 1332.
Fourth, the court held that, through publishing the names of the individuals and entities
which were being investigated, the government violated the "time-honored tradition of
grand jury secrecy." Id. at 1334. Fifth, the court determined that the government im-
properly imposed obligations of secrecy on two grand jury witnesses for strategic pur-
poses, in violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e). Id at 1335-36. Sixth, the
government made only informal offers of immunity to some witnesses. The court found
that the informal nature of these offers placed witnesses in fear that immunity might be
withdrawn unless their testimony pleased the government. Id. at 1336-38. Seventh, the
court found that the government prejudiced the jury against some defendants by calling
them to testify, even though it knew these defendants would invoke their fifth amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination. Id. at 1338. Eighth, the court found that the
government "summarized" evidence which actually had never been presented to the
grand jury. Id. at 1339-40. Ninth, the court determined that government prosecutors
had interrogated witnesses "without notice to or leave of defense counsel." Id. at 1342.
Finally, the court found that the prosecution grossly mistreated the defense's tax expert
during a recess, within the hearing of some of the grand jurors. Id. at 1343.
34 United States v. Kilpatrick, 821 F.2d 1456, 1474 (1987), aff'd sub nom. Bank of
Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
35 Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 263-64.
36 Id. at 255. This power was granted under 18 U.S.C. § 687 (1946 ed.) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 3771 at the time Nova Scotia was decided), which invested the Court with
authority to "prescribe, from time to time, rules of pleading, practice, and procedure
with respect to any or all proceedings prior to and including verdict .... [AIll laws in
conflict therewith shall be of no further force and effect."
18 U.S.C. § 3771 was repealed by Act Nov. 19, 1988, P.L. 100-702, Title IV,
§ 404(a), 102 Stat. 4651, effective Dec. 1, 1988, as provided by § 407 of such Act, which
appears as 28 U.S.C. § 2071 note. Similar provisions now appear in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2071 (a), which provides that "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act
of Congress may from time to time prescribe rules for the conduct of their business... "
and 28 U.S.C. § 2074, which allows the Supreme Court to fix the extent that rules of
722 [Vol. 83
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nore or circumvent the Rule "simply 'in order to chastise what the
court[s] view as prosecutorial overreaching.' -37 The Court also
adopted Justice O'Connor's test for dismissal of an indictment, set
forth in her concurrence in Mechanik: dismissal is appropriate only if
the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to in-
dict or if "grave doubt" exists that the decision to indict was free
from any substantial influence by such violations. 38
The circuit courts have also addressed the issue of whether in-
dictments may be dismissed for prosecutorial misconduct, particu-
larly in the form of failure to present exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury. Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Nova Scotia,
both the Eleventh and Sixth Circuits stated simply that the prosecu-
tion has no duty to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.39
The Sixth Circuit noted that the grand jury plays an investigative,
non-adversarial role, and that exculpatory evidence therefore need
not be presented.
40
After Nova Scotia, the Ninth Circuit took a more moderate
stance, stating that no affirmative duty exists for the prosecutor to
present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.4 1 Under Nova Sco-
procedure and evidence promulgated by the Court under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1992
Supp.) apply to pending proceedings. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071(a), 2074 (1992 Supp.).
37 Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 255 (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 507
(1983)). In Hasting, the defendants were tried and convicted of kidnapping, transporting
women across state lines for immoral purposes, and conspiracy to commit these of-
fenses. The prosecution commented during summation that the defendants had never
challenged the charges. The defense argued that these statements violated the defend-
ant's fifth amendment rights under Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (characteri-
zation by prosecutor of testimony as uncontradicted is error if only the nontestifying
defendant can dispute the testimony). The Seventh Circuit declined to follow the harm-
less-error rule and reversed the convictions. Hasting, 461 U.S. at 503. Citing the harm-
less-error doctrine, the Court reversed and remanded the case. Id. at 504.
38 Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 78
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
39 United States v. Hawkins, 765 F.2d 1482, 1488 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474
U.S. 1103 (1986) (citing United States v. Ruyle, 524 F.2d 1133, 1136, (6th Cir. 1975)
(defendant may not challenge superceding indictment on grounds that the second grand
jury may have heard less evidence than the first grand jury), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 934
(1976)); United States v. Hyder, 732 F.2d 841, 844-45 (11 th Cir. 1984) (government not
obligated to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury); United States v. Adamo,
742 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1984) (following Ruyle, 524 F.2d at 1136, for the proposition that
a federal prosecutor is not obligated to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury),
cert. denied sub nom. Freeman v. United States, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985); United States v.
Morano, 697 F.2d 923, 927 (11 th Cir. 1983) ("An indictment valid on its face cannot be
challenged merely because the grand jury acted on inadequate or incompetent
evidence.").
40 Adamo, 742 F.2d at 937.
41 United States v. Larrazolo, 869 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1989). In support of its posi-
tion, the Ninth Circuit cited United States v. Al Mudarris, 695 F.2d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir.
1983) (citing United States v. Tham, 665 F.2d 855, 863 (9th Cir. 1982) (prosecution has
19931
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tia, a court may dismiss a grand jury indictment for prosecutorial
misconduct which substantially influences the grand jury's decision
to indict or raises "grave doubt" that the indictment was free from
such influence. 4 2 The Ninth Circuit determined that this rule did
not preclude dismissal if prejudice existed.43 In this case, however,
the prosecution's failure to present possibly exculpatory evidence to
the grand jury did not result in prejudice.44 Similarly, the First and
Eighth Circuits have held that the prosecution normally has no duty
to disclose exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.
45
Alternatively, the Second, Seventh and Tenth Circuits have
held that prosecutors do have a duty to present substantially excul-
patory evidence to the grand jury. The Second Circuit stated that
the prosecution should provide the grand jury with "any substantial
evidence negating guilt" which might reasonably lead the grand jury
to not indict. 46 The Seventh Circuit requires prosecutors to present
no duty to present to the grand jury matters concerning witness credibility or exculpa-
tory evidence), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1981)), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 932 (1983); United
States v. Trass, 644 F.2d 791, 796 (9th Cir. 1981) (facially valid indictment sufficient for
trial on the merits); United States v. Kennedy, 564 F.2d 1329, 1337-38 (9th Cir. 1977)
(indictment should be dismissed only for flagrant error relating to material matter), cert.
deniedsub nom. Meyers v. United States, 435 U.S. 944 (1978); United States v. Cederquist,
641 F.2d 1347, 1353 n.3 (9th Cir. 1981) (failure by prosecution to present evidence
favorable to defendant to the grand jury is not basis for dismissal of the indictment).
42 Larrazolo, 869 F.2d at 1358 (quoting Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 256 (quoting
Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 78 (O'Connor, J., concurring))) (internal quotations omitted).
43 Id. at 1358.
44 Id. at 1360. In Larrazolo, the defendants were indicted for conspiring to distribute
and to possess marijuana with intent to distribute. The defendants argued, inter alia,
that the prosecution's failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury consti-
tuted error. Id. at 1359. Specifically, the defendants claimed that their statements in
their arrest reports and the arrest report of their father (not a defendant on appeal) were
exculpatory and should have been presented to the grand jury. Id. Because the defend-
ants failed to show that actual prejudice resulted from the withholding of the potentially
exculpatory evidence, the Court upheld the indictment. Id. at 1360.
45 United States v. Vincent, 901 F.2d 97 (8th Cir. 1990) (government normally not
under duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury; validity of grand jury
indictment may not be challenged for being based on inadequate or incompetent evi-
dence) (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974), United States v.
Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 831 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 844 (1988)); United States
v. Rivera-Santiago, 872 F.2d 1073, 1087 (1st Cir. 1989) (prosecution normally has no
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to a grand jury; a facially valid indictment is suffi-
cient to call for a trial on the merits) (citing Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363
(1956), Bucci, 839 F.2d at 831, United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 517 (Ist Cir.
1986)).
Interestingly, in both Rivera-Santiago and Bucci the First Circuit also cited United
States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 727-28 (10th Cir. 1987)-the precedent used by the Tenth
Circuit in Williams-as general support for the proposition that the prosecution normally
has no duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Rivera-Santiago, 872 F.2d
at 1087; Bucci, 839 F.2d at 831.
46 United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1979) (prosecution should
724 [Vol. 83
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to the grand jury evidence which dearly negates guilt.47 Similarly,
in United States v. Page,48 the Tenth Circuit ruled that, while the pros-
ecution need not "ferret out and present every bit of potentially ex-
culpatory evidence," it must reveal substantial exculpatory evidence
to the grand jury.
49
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
John H. Williams, a Tulsa, Oklahoma businessman, obtained
loans and loan renewals from four Tulsa banks between September
1984 and November 1985.50 For each loan or loan renewal, Wil-
liams provided the banks with a list of "current assets" and a "state-
ment of projected income and expense." 5 1
When organized in accordance with Generally Accepted Ac-
present substantial evidence negating guilt to the grand jury when such evidence might
reasonably lead the grand jury to not indict). See also United States v. Bari, 750 F.2d
1169, 1176 (2d Cir. 1984) (if prosecution knows of substantial evidence which negates
guilt it should inform grand jury, but dismissal is only justified when prosecution know-
ingly or recklessly misleads grand jury regarding an essential fact), cert. denied sub nom.
Benfield v. United States, 472 U.S. 1019 (1985).
The Second Circuit created this rule in addition to other law, adopted from other
circuits, that limited the prosecution's discretion in presenting evidence to the grand
jury. First, the prosecution may not obtain an indictment on the basis of material evi-
dence which the prosecution knows to be perjurious. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d
781, 785-86 (9th Cir. 1974). Second, the prosecution may not lead the grand jury to
believe that hearsay evidence is actually eyewitness testimony. United States v. Estepa,
471 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (2d Cir. 1972).
47 United States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1983) (prosecution must pres-
ent evidence which clearly negates target's guilt to the grand jury, but need not present
all possibly exculpatory evidence), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1068 (1984).
The Seventh Circuit noted in Kompare v. Stein, 801 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1986) that
case law regarding the prosecution's duty to reveal substantially exculpatory evidence to
the grand jury only began to develop in 1975, and as of 1986 (when Kompare was de-
cided) the law was unclear. Id. at 890 n.8. The Seventh Circuit first mentioned the duty
in Flomenhoft. Id.
48 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987).
49 Id. at 728. In Page, a former assistant district attorney was convicted of engaging
in racketeering activities affecting interstate commerce and of obstructing, affecting and
delaying interstate commerce through extortion. Id. at 725-26. Following conviction,
the defendant claimed that the prosecution failed to present the grand jury with exculpa-
tory evidence regarding payments taken to fix cases. Id. at 727. The defendant asserted
that this evidence-in the form of tax returns, canceled checks and a client's testimony-
went to show that he had not taken illegal payments. Id. at 728. Such prosecutorial
misconduct, the defendant argued, warranted dismissal of the indictment. Id.
In order to decide this issue, the Tenth Circuit adopted the rule that when "substan-
tial exculpatory evidence is discovered in the course of an investigation, it must be re-
vealed to the grand jury." Id. Applying this rule, the court found that withholding the
evidence from the grand jury resulted in no error because the evidence was not clearly
exculpatory. Id.




counting Principles (GAAP), a list of current assets records the fair
market value of assets which will be realized in cash within one
year.52 Williams' statements, however, listed several investments at
cost, not fair market value.53 Included in his current assets were
"notes receivable" for investments, totalling between $5 million and
$6 million, in several new venture capital corporations with negative
net values. 54 The negative net worth of these corporations made it
likely that the costs of these investments would exceed their fair
market value. In Williams' defense, each statement did contain a
disclaimer in a legend on its front page which stated that the venture
corporation investments were listed at cost, not fair market value. 55
Williams' other financial statement, a "Statement of Projected
Income and Expense," included interest income payable on the
above notes receivable. 56
The government claimed that Williams used these statements
to intentionally mislead the banks by improperly giving these invest-
ments the appearance of assets which were readily realizable in liq-
uid form.57 The government asserted that these items should not
have been listed as current assets because the poor financial posi-
tion of these corporations precluded their recovery within one
year.58 The government also alleged that Williams misled the banks
by listing interest payments from the venture corporations in his
statement of projected income and expense.59 Because the venture
companies maintained such weak financial positions and generated
no profits, the government claimed, any interest income could only
be generated using funds invested directly into the corporations,
such as the investments made by Williams. 60 Thus, the government
asserted, disclosure of these payments as interest income was likely
to have misled the banks into believing the interest constituted a
source of independent income. 6'
On May 4, 1988, after a six-month investigation, a federal
grand jury returned a seven count indictment charging Williams
52 United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1990); BLACK'S LAw Dic-
TIONARY 382 (6th ed. 1990).
53 Brief of Respondent at 10, United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735 (No. 90-
1972) (1992).
54 Williams, 899 F.2d at 899.
55 Brief of Respondent, supra note 53, at 10.
56 Williams, 899 F.2d at 899.
57 United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1737 (1992).
58 Id. at 1737; Brief for the United States at 2, Williams (No. 90-1972) (1992).





with defrauding a bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1014.62
After arraignment, Williams filed a motion with the district
court pursuant to the ruling in Brady v. Maryland63 for disclosure of
all exculpatory portions of the grand jury transcript.64 The district
court granted the motion, and the government indicated it would
comply by supplying Williams with any exculpatory evidence.65
After examining the provided materials, Williams filed a motion
to dismiss, claiming that the government had failed to fulfill its du-
ties required under United States v. Page66 to present "substantially
exculpatory evidence" to the grand jury.67 Williams argued that his
statements of current assets and projected income and expense
were of a substantial exculpatory nature because they showed that
he lacked intent to defraud the banks. Specifically, Williams claimed
these records showed that he had consistently accounted for his in-
terest income and notes receivable in the same manner he presented
them to the Tulsa banks. The consistent use of these accounting
methods, he claimed, showed a decided lack of intent on his part to
defraud the banks because it "indicate[d] a lawful basis for the infor-
mation provided to the banks." a68 Furthermore, Williams continued,
the legends located at the bottom of the first page of each current
asset statement clearly stated that the venture corporation invest-
ments were valued at cost, not fair market value. These additional
statements, Williams argued, also negated intent.
69
In addition to these records, Williams claimed that the govern-
ment possessed but had failed to produce a five-volume deposition,
given by Williams in a contemporaneous bankruptcy proceeding, in
which he offered legitimate explanations for his methods of ac-
62 The statute states in relevant part:
[wihoever knowingly makes any false statement or report, or willfully overvalues
any land, property or security, for the purpose of influencing in any way the action
of... any institution the accounts of which are insured by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation... [upon any] loan, or any extension of the same ... shall
be fined not more that $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 30 years or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1014 (1988 ed., Supp. II).
63 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
64 Williams, 899 F.2d at 899. In Brady, the defendant, who was tried and convicted for
first degree felony murder, appealed on the grounds that the prosecution had withheld
during trial a confession by an accomplice in which the accomplice confessed to commit-
ting the murder. Brady, 373 U.S. at 84. The Supreme Court held that "the suppression
by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due pro-
cess where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Id. at 87.
65 Williams, 899 F.2d at 899.
66 808 F.2d 723 (1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987).
67 Id. at 728 (emphasis omitted). See supra note 49 for a discussion of Page.
68 Williams, 899 F.2d at 900.
69 Brief of Respondent, supra note 53, at 10.
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counting.70 According to Williams, these explanations also negated
the requisite intent required under the statute.
71
The district court initially denied Williams' motion. 72 Upon re-
consideration, however, the court dismissed the indictment without
prejudice. 73 The withheld information, the court concluded, consti-
tuted substantial exculpatory evidence, raised "reasonable doubt
about the defendant's intent to defraud" and rendered the grand
jury's indictment "gravely suspect." 74
The government appealed the district court's finding that it
withheld substantial exculpatory evidence from the grand jury. 75
The government contended it had presented the grand jury with all
relevant evidence concerning Williams' financial statements, and as-
serted that the deposition testimony's "self-serving" nature pre-
vented it from being substantially exculpatory. 76 In the alternative,
the government argued that the remedy of dismissal was inappropri-
ate.77 Williams cross-appealed, claiming that the indictment should
have been dismissed with prejudice. 78
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision in its entirety.79 The Tenth Circuit explained that
the district court had defined the withheld information as substan-
tially exculpatory, and that absent clear error this finding of fact
could not be reversed. 80 In this case, the circuit court noted that,
although the facts could be interpreted differently, the district
court's decision was not clearly erroneous. The court held further






76 Id. at 901. In its brief to the Tenth Circuit, the government urged the court " 'to
review the grand jury transcripts .. .and satisfy itself of the accuracy of the govern-
ment's position.'" Id. at 903 (quoting Government's Response, April 5, 1989, at 9).
However, the grand jury transcript was not designated as part of the record. The Tenth
Circuit provided these comments:
[i]f we had the benefit of reviewing the grand jury transcript, our review of the
deposition's exculpatory evidence may have lead [sic] to a different conclusion.
Nevertheless, we conclude that the explanations regarding the classification of the
notes as well as their valuation in the financial statements are consistent with the
possible theory that defendant simply did not intend to mislead the banks. Id. at
903.
77 Id. at 900.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 904.
80 Id. at 900 (citing Lone Star Steel Co. v. United Mine Workers, 851 F.2d 1239 (10th
Cir. 1988)). The court noted that, although this rule is set forth in Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 52(a), it is also applied to certain issues in criminal proceedings. Id. (citing
United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1986)).
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that the prosecution substantially influenced the grand jury by with-
holding the substantial exculpatory evidence, or at least "'cast
grave doubt that the decision to indict was free from such substan-
tial influence.' "81 Since withholding this evidence might have in-
fringed on the grand jury's ability to exercise independent
judgment, the district court had properly granted dismissal under
the rule set forth in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States.8 2
Finally, the Tenth Circuit denied Williams' request for dismissal
with prejudice. The court reasoned that dismissal without prejudice
was entirely proper in this case because it left the government free
to reintroduce its case to a grand jury, with the exculpatory evidence
included, for determination of probable cause.83
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address
the issue of whether a district court may dismiss an otherwise valid
indictment due to government failure to disclose substantial excul-
patory evidence in its possession to the grand jury.84
IV. THE SUPRME COURT OPINIONS
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit. The Court held that the indictments
could not be dismissed for the prosecution's failure to present sub-
stantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, because to do so
would infringe on the traditional independence of the grand jury
institution.8 5 The Court also expanded its broad rule for granting
review by determining that certiorari had not been improvidently
granted, even though the question presented had been neither
pressed nor passed upon below.86
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
1. The Granting of Certiorari
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court.87 By granting
81 United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898, 903 (10th Cir. 1990) (quoting Bank of
Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 263 (1988)).
82 Id. In Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. 250 (1988), the Supreme Court set forth the following
standard for dismissing an indictment for nonconstitutional error: "[t]he prejudicial in-
quiry must focus on whether any violations had an effect on the grand jury's decision to
indict. If violations did substantially influence this decision, or if there is grave doubt
that the decision to indict was free from such substantial influence, the violations cannot
be deemed harmless." Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 263.
83 Williams, 899 F.2d at 904 (citing Record, vol. 6, at 5).
84 United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1737 (1992).
85 Id. at 1740-41, 1745.
86 Id at 1738.
87 Id at 1737. Justice Scalia was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
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certiorari in this case, the Court increased its discretionary power of
review. 88 The government had sought and been granted certiorari
on the question of "[w]hether an indictment may be dismissed be-
cause the government failed to present exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury."' 89 The Court's traditional rule for granting certiorari
precludes review only when " 'the question presented was not
pressed or passed upon below.' "90 Although the question in this
case had not been presented in the lower courts, the Court nonethe-
less stated that a grant of certiorari was entirely in accord with its
traditional practice for granting review. The Court noted that it
would be "improvident" to dismiss the writ of certiorari after brief-
ing, argument and full consideration by the court.91 Review of an
issue not pressed or passed upon below was justified if the following
conditions were satisfied: first, the issue must have been addressed
in a recent case; second, that recent case must have been used as
precedent in the instant case; and third, the party contesting the is-
sue in the instant case must have been a litigant in that precedential
case.
9 2
Under this rule, according to the Court, a grant of certiorari in
the instant case was entirely proper. In United States v. Page,93 the
Tenth Circuit had ruled against the government's position and had
set forth the rule that the prosecution in a criminal case has the duty
to present substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.9 4 In
ruling upon Williams, the Tenth Circuit had applied the Page rule
without objection from the government. The Court reasoned, how-
ever, that it would be "unreasonable" to require a litigant to object
to such directly applicable and recent precedent in order to be
White, Kennedy and Souter. Justice Thomas also joined, but only regarding the grant
of certiorari.
88 The Court has declared that "[t]his Court sits as a court of review. It is only in
exceptional cases coming here from the federal courts that questions not pressed or
passed upon below are reviewed." Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200 (1927).
See also United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 788 n.7 (1977) (no review of questions
not raised below except in exceptional circumstances); United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891, 898 (1975) (declining to address issue raised for first time in petition for certiorari).
89 Id. at 1739.
90 Id. at 1738 (quoting the dissent at 1747-48).
91 Id.
92 Id. 1740-41. The Court's precise language is as follows:
It is a permissible exercise of our discretion to undertake review of an important
issue expressly decided by a federal court where, although the petitioner did not
contest the issue in the case immediately at hand, it did so as a party to the recent
proceeding upon which the lower courts relied for their resolution of the issue, and
did not concede in the current case the correctness of that precedent. Id. (footnotes
omitted).
93 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987).
94 Id. at 728.
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granted certiorari upon that issue.95 It was sufficient that in this
case the government had merely complied with the Page rule with-
out acknowledging its correctness. 96 Because the government had
not conceded the propriety of the Page rule, it was within the Court's
discretion to grant review, even though the issue had been neither
pressed nor passed upon in the courts below.9
7
The Court conceded that the government would naturally ben-
efit from this rule permitting the Court to grant certiorari more
often than other parties, it being the most frequent litigant in the
federal courts. However, since such a benefit inevitably occurs with
most desirable rules of procedure or jurisdiction, the Court con-
cluded that this expanded rule does not amount to favoritism for the
government on the part of the Court.
98
2. Court Supervision and Control of the Grand Jury
Emphasizing the historical independence of the grand jury
from the courts, the Court concluded that the district court should
not have dismissed the indictment against Williams. The Court thus
declined to follow the rule suggested in Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
States99 that an indictment may be dismissed where errors before the
grand jury prejudiced the defendants.100 Instead, the Court stated
that, barring violation of a specific Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure, courts lack sufficient supervisory power over the grand jury to
dismiss indictments.10' Thus, failure by the prosecution to present
substantial exculpatory evidence in its possession to the grand jury
does not warrant dismissal.
The Court provided further support for its holding that courts
may not dismiss indictments when the prosecution fails to present
95 United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1740 (1992).
96 Id. The majority stated that the government had merely "acknowledged 'that it
has certain responsibilities under... Page.' " Id. (quoting Brief for the United States in
Response to Appellee's Brief at 9, United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898 (10th Cir.
1990) (Nos. 88-2827, 88-2843) (emphasis omitted)). The dissent, however, described
the government as having "expressly acknowledged the responsibilities described in
Page." Id. at 1747-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 1740-41.
98 Id. at 1741.
99 487 U.S. 250 (1987).
100 Id. at 254.
101 United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1741-42 (1992). The Court emphasized
that this broad discretion is only "'bound by a few, clear rules which were carefully
drafted and approved by this Court and by Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand
jury's function.'" Id. at 1741 (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74
(1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). These rules, however, are only intended as "means
of enforcing... legally compelled standards," not as a "means of prescribing those stan-
dards of prosecutorial conduct in the first instance .... " Id. at 1742.
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substantial exculpatory evidence in its possession by noting that the
entire theory behind the grand jury is that it should serve as a
"buffer or referee between the government and the people."' 10
2
Furthermore, the grand jury has not been "textually assigned" to
any branch of government, and aside from the calling together of
the grand jurors and the administering of their oaths of office,
judges have never been directly involved in the functioning of the
grand jury. 10
3
The Court found additional support for the independence of
the grand jury in language taken from earlier decisions which stated
that the Fifth Amendment's constitutional guaranty "presupposes"
an investigative body which acts independently of the prosecution
and judge. 0 4 As a result, the grand jury should remain free to con-
duct its investigations unhindered by external supervision so long as
the grand jury does not infringe upon the rights of witnesses called
before it.105 To infringe on this freedom by imposing increased su-
pervision would impinge on the grand jury's role as an independent
accusatory body. The Court thus rejected Williams' argument that
the Page rule was justified as "a sort of Fifth Amendment 'common
law', a necessary means of assuring the constitutional right to the
judgment 'of an independent and informed grand jury.' "106
The majority countered the dissent's argument for preservation
of the grand jury's dual roles of accuser and protector by comment-
ing that, if a balance between the accusatory and protective roles of
the grand jury were truly a concern, then logically the method by
which this should be accomplished would be to entitle a person
targeted by a grand jury investigation to provide a defense before
the grand jury. 0 7 To deny this option while requiring the prosecu-
tor to provide the grand jury with defense material, however, would
be "quite absurd."108 It also would be illogical to dismiss the indict-
ment in this instance because the grand jury is not obligated to hear
any more evidence than that which convinces it that an indictment is
proper. 109 Had the prosecution offered to present the exculpatory
102 Id. at 1742.
103 Id. (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974); FED. R. CRIM. P.
6(a) (giving the courts the power to call the grand jury and the administer the grand
jurors' oaths of office)).
104 Id. at 1743 (citing United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); Stirone v. United
States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960)).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 1744 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962); citing Brief for
Respondent, supra note 53, at 27).





evidence to the grand jury and the grand jury had refused to hear it
because it was convinced an indictment was justified, dismissal
would not be possible. 110 "We reject," stated the Court, "the at-
tempt to convert a nonexistent duty of the grand jury itself into an
obligation of the prosecutor."1"'
Finally, the majority rejected Williams' argument that a rule
which requires presentation of such evidence would promote judi-
cial economy by removing unjustified prosecutions from the federal
docket. 12 Williams' argument followed the Tenth Circuit's reason-
ing set forth in Page: if a fully informed grand jury cannot find prob-
able cause to indict, then there is little chance that the prosecution
could have proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before a petit
jury.' 13 The Court questioned whether such an approach would in
fact save valuable judicial time: such a savings, it suggested, would
depend upon the actual ratio of unjustified prosecutions eliminated
to grand jury indictments challenged. Nevertheless, such policy
making was not the role of the Court, and was more properly left for
the legislative branch. "[I]f there is an advantage to the proposal,'
the Court concluded, "Congress is free to prescribe it." 114
B. THE DISSENTING OPINION
1. The Granting of Certiorari
The dissent, written by Justice Stevens, fully agreed with the
majority concerning the traditional rule for granting certiorari. 115
Following this rule, the dissent argued that certiorari had been im-
providently granted because, in this case, the question presented
had never been presented or passed upon below.1 16
The dissent's disagreement hinged on the rule, set forth in
United States v. Page, 1 7 that the prosecution in a criminal case must
present substantially exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.118 Be-
cause the government never objected to the Tenth Circuit's applica-
tion of the Page rule, the question of this standard's appropriateness
had been neither passed upon nor presented below. Therefore, ac-
110 Il
111 Id.
112 Id. at 1746.
113 Id (citing United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723, 728 (10th Cir. 1987)).
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1748 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and O'Connor joined the
dissent. Justice Thomas also joined concerning the courts' supervisory power over the
grand jury, but not regarding the grant of certiorari.
116 Id. at 1746-49 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
117 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987).
118 Id. at 728.
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cording to Justice Stevens, certiorari had been improvidently
granted. 119 The dissent decried the Court's new rule for granting
certiorari and argued that it improperly extended the Court's power
to grant certiorari in a manner which would result in favoritism for
the government over ordinary litigants.'
20
Justice Stevens argued further that, even though the case had
already been fully briefed and argued, dismissal of the writ as im-
providently granted would have been entirely appropriate: a vote of
four justices is sufficient to grant a petition for certiorari, but this
does not preclude subsequent dismissal by a 5-4 vote.'
2 1
2. Court Supervision and Control of the Grand Jury
The dissent interpreted the grand jury's traditional role differ-
ently than the majority and asserted that the prosecution must be
required to present substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand
jury. Otherwise, the prosecution would be able to mislead a grand
jury into believing that probable cause to indict exists by withhold-
ing evidence which clearly negates guilt. 122 The dissent agreed with
the Court, however, that the government should not be required to
place all exculpatory evidence before the grand jury, because such a
requirement would be inconsistent with the grand jury's purpose
and would place excessive burdens on the prosecution.
23
First, the dissent observed that, despite its independent role,
the grand jury remains an appendage of the court which requires
the court's aid to carry out its functions.' 24 Second, the dissent em-
phasized that the grand jury has the dual duties of acting as both an
investigative body and a protective one against improper and op-
pressive governmental action. 125 Third, the dissent followed the
Court's reasoning in Berger v. United States 126 and argued that, be-
119 United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1747-48 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 1748 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
121 Id. at 1749 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent cited NAACP v. Overstreet,
384 U.S. 118 (1966), dismissed over the dissent of four justices after briefing and argu-
ment, as an example.
122 Id. at 1754 (Stevens, J, dissenting).
123 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
124 Id. at 1752 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41
(1959)).
125 Id. at 1753 (Stevens,J, dissenting) (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 339,
343 (1974)). In Calandra, the Court explained that the traditionally wide latitude given
to the grand jury reflected its special role in fair and effective law enforcement. Calandra,
414 U.S. at 343. In contrast, the Court in Williams dismissed this qualification of the
grand jury's broad powers and cited Calandra to support its position of noninterference
with the grand jury's function. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1743-46 (1992)
(citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343).
126 295 U.S. 78 (1935).
734 [Vol. 83
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
cause prosecutors represent the government, their responsibilities
include both the obligation to refrain from improper methods for
obtaining a conviction and the duty to use all legitimate means avail-
able to secure a just one.
127
In the eyes of the dissent, the issue was one of fundamental
fairness of grand jury proceedings. 128 The mere fact that no statute
proscribes a certain action, such as the withholding of substantial
exculpatory evidence by the prosecution, does not mean that the
court lacks authority to supervise the grand jury when its proceed-
ings threaten to preclude the grand jury's fulfillment of its dual
roles.129 In order to protect the integrity of grandjury proceedings,
the courts must be allowed to penalize unrestrained prosecutorial
misconduct by dismissing indictments thereby obtained.1
30
Finally, the dissent noted that statements in the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice's United States Attorneys' Manual supported a rule
requiring presentation of substantial exculpatory evidence to the
grand jury: "[W]hen a prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is
personally aware of substantial evidence which directly negates the
guilt of a subject of the investigation, the prosecutor must present
or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury before seeking
an indictment against such person."''
V. ANALYSIS
In Williams, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the grand jury's in-
dependence from court supervision by rejecting a rule requiring the
prosecution to present substantial exculpatory evidence to the
grandjury. In doing so, the Court emphasized the grand jury's his-
torical independence and role as an accusatory body unfettered by
court-imposed restraints. As a secondary matter, the Court ex-
panded its powers of review by allowing for review of questions not
pressed or passed upon below. This Note predicts that this decision
may lead to increased aggressiveness by prosecutors in obtaining
127 Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1750 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Berger, 295 U.S. at 88).
The dissent quoted the following passage from Berger:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a con-
troversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compel-
ling as its obligation to govern at all .... It is as much his duty to refrain from
improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one. Berger, 295 U.S. at 88.
128 Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1746 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
129 Id. at 1753 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 1752 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
131 Id. at 1754 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. Dept. ofJustice, UNrrED STATES
ATrORNEYS' MANUAL, Title 9, ch. 11, 9-11.233 (1988).
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indictments, since prosecutorial misconduct in the form of failure to
present substantial exculpatory evidence will not lead to dismissal of
indictments. This Note also suggests that the Court's ruling over
emphasizes the grand jury's independence at the expense of another
historical function of the grand jury: protection of citizens from un-
fair prosecution.
Regarding the expanded power of review set forth in this case,
this Note predicts that such a rule may result in a greater number of
appeals to the Supreme Court in decisions unfavorable to the gov-
ernment. This expanded rule potentially favors the government in
court proceedings by providing it with a much greater chance for
review of some unfavorable decisions than other parties enjoy. The
ultimate effect of this potential favoritism, however, will depend
upon whether the Court grants certiorari in these cases, and if so,
whether the Court affirms or reverses these decisions.
A. JUDICIAL SUPERVISION OF THE GRAND JURY
1. The Court and Dissent's Difering Definitions of the Grand Jury's Role
The conclusions reached by the Court and the dissent depend
upon the different definitions each gave to the grand jury's function.
Because their conclusions center on these mutually exclusive defini-
tions of the grand jury's role, the two positions seem irreconcilable.
The Court defines the grand jury as a purely accusatory body,
which for that reason must remain as independent as possible from
court interference and supervision. 132 This reasoning follows the
Court's decision in Costello v. United States,13 3 in which the Court em-
phasized the grand jury's historical independence in upholding a
facially valid indictment based on hearsay. 134 By definition, an in-
dependent grand jury must have minimal judicial supervision and
interference. Aside from court supervision as provided by Rule 6 of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and by statute, the courts
cannot interfere with grand jury proceedings to dismiss an
indictment. ' 3
5
The dissent's definition of the grand jury's role necessarily
132 Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1742 (citing Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218
(1960); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 61 (1906); GEORGE J. EDWARDS, JR., THE GRAND
JURY, 28-32 (1906)). See supra text accompanying notes 7-28.
133 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
134 Id. at 363.
135 Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1742 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 339, 343
(1974); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a)). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(a) reads as follows:
(a) Summoning of Grand Juries.
(1) Generally. The court shall order one or more grand juries to be sum-
moned at such time as the public interest requires. The grand jury shall consist of
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leads it to a different conclusion. According to the dissent, the
grand jury fulfills the dual purposes of acting as both an accuser of
crimes and a protector of citizens from unjust prosecution.' 36
Although court supervision must be limited to protect the former,
to promote the latter it must also extend to the dismissal of indict-
ments wrongfully obtained.'i 7 Even if not explicitly prohibited by
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure or by statute, extreme acts
of prosecutorial misconduct which promote unjust prosecution of
citizens must be disciplined by the courts.-1 8
2. The Dissent's Rule is More Balanced
The majority's decision properly defends the independence of
the grand jury. It also aptly notes that great care must be taken not
to transform grand jury proceedings from a process for determining
probable cause to indict into a process for determining guilt.'39
However, because it ignores the traditional protective function of
the grand jury, the Court views any requirement that substantial ex-
culpatory evidence be presented to the grand jury not as a protec-
tion against prosecutorial misconduct, but as an erosion of the
grand jury's independent, accusatory function. 140 Because prosecu-
tors would be able to withhold much substantial exculpatory infor-
mation with impunity, the Court's decision may result in a less
informed grand jury which makes less accurate decisions.
In contrast, the dissent proposes a balancing approach: in order
to prevent abuses which harm the grand jury's function, the court
must counterbalance the independence of the grand jury with su-
pervision. Thus, the dissent suggests a more case-by-case analysis
than the "hands off" approach adopted by the majority. While such
a case-by-case method lacks the appealing simplicity of the major-
ity's approach, the dissent's pragmatic balancing test probably
not less than 16 nor more than 23 members. The court shall direct that a sufficient
number of legally qualified persons be summoned to meet this requirement.
(2) Alternate Jurors. The court may direct that alternate jurors may be desig-
nated at the time a grand jury is selected. Alternate jurors in the order in which
they were designated may thereafter be impanelled as provided in subdivision (g) of
this rule. Alternate jurors shall be drawn in the same manner and shall have the
same qualifications as the regular jurors, and if impanelled shall be subject to the
same challenges, shall take the same oath and shall have the same functions, pow-
ers, facilities and privileges as the regular jurors.
136 Id. at 1753 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra text accompanying notes 122-27.
137 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343; Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375 (1962) (grand jury must be both independent and informed)).
138 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 1744.
140 Id. at 1742.
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would improve the grand jury's functioning as both accuser and
protector.
The Court argues in response that if presentation of exculpa-
tory evidence to the grand jury were desirable, then logically the
best way to do this would be to let the party under investigation
testify. The Court properly notes, however, that such a rule would
infringe on the petit jury's function.14' Therefore, the Court con-
cludes, requiring presentation of substantial exculpatory evidence
to the grand jury is undesirable.142
Yet instead of transforming the grand jury process into a mini-
trial on the merits, a requirement that the prosecution present sub-
stantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury might balance the
grand jury's accusatory and protective roles. First, better informed
grand juries would result in more knowledgeable indictments. To
protect the grand jury's traditional independence, however, the
grand jury would retain its traditional freedom to refuse to hear the
evidence, and any indictment issued following such a refusal would
still be valid.143 This approach would better inform the grand jury
while still respecting its independence and discretion in issuing
indictments.
In contrast, a rule which permits the prosecutor to withhold in-
formation directly relevant to this determination harms this process
by making the grand jury's decision potentially skewed in favor of
the prosecution. 144 By allowing for increasingly biased indictments,
this rule would undermine the protective role of the grand jury. 145
3. Possible Changes in the Grand Jury's Role
The modem grand jury arguably operates in a much different
setting than its historical counterpart. Critics contend that the mod-
em grand jury lacks independence and no longer fulfills its protec-
tive role.146 These critics also suggest that the modern grand jury
relies on more informed prosecutors in determining probable
141 Id. at 1745.
142 Id. at 1746.
143 This approach quells the fears expressed by the Court that any rule requiring the
prosecution to present substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury would erode
the historical independence of the grand jury. See id. at 1745.
144 Id. at 1754 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
145 Id. at 1753 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343; Wood v.
Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962)).
146 United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In Mara,
the Court ruled that requiring a witness to provide a sample of his handwriting to the
grand jury did not violate the fourth amendment. Id. at 22. Justice Douglas decried the
prosecution's use of the grand jury to circumvent constitutional restrictions on its pow-
ers. Id. at 29.
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cause, with the result that prosecutors can obtain indictments al-
most at will. 147 Some lower federal courts also express concern that
the grand jury is used as a "pawn" or "mere tool" of the prosecu-
tion. 148 Allowing courts to dismiss indictments for prosecutorial
failure to present substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand jury
might result in a better informed grand jury which does not merely
act as the pawn of the executive branch. Such a rule would promote
the grand jury's historical independence, as well as its traditional
protective role.
B. THE GRANT OF CERTIORARI
The Court's traditional rule for granting certiorari precludes
review only if the question was neither pressed nor passed upon be-
low. 14 9 In Williams, the issue presented to the Court satisfied neither
of these requirements. The grant of certiorari in this case therefore
may be seen as an expansion of the Court's power of review. The
Court's reasoning seems to suggest that an issue not directly
pressed or passed upon in the lower courts was implicitly pressed or
passed upon in the current case if the following conditions are met:
a. The question was pressed or passed upon in a recent case.
b. That recent decision was used as direct precedent by the lower
courts in the current case.
c. The litigant raising the issue on appeal in the current case was also
a litigant in the recent case used as precedent by the lower courts.
d. That litigant did not acknowledge the propriety of this rule from
the recent decision, even though it may have complied with this rule as
direct precedent.
In other words, because the rule is so recent and directly applicable
in the instant case, the correctness of that rule is implicitly and in-
herently an issue in this case, and it therefore may be reviewed by
the Supreme Court. 150
147 Id. See also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir.
1973). Schofield involved a witness who refused to supply writing samples to the grand
jury and refused to allow the government to take her fingerprints and photograph. Id. at
87. In requiring the government to make a preliminary showing of reasonableness
before the witness could be held in contempt, the court commented that it was a "funda-
mental proposition" that the grand jury acts as an investigative and prosecutorial arm of
the executive branch. Id. at 90, 94.
148 United States v. Weingartner, 485 F. Supp. 1167 (D.NJ.), appeal dismissed, 642 F.2d
445 (3d Cir. 1981).
149 United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1738 (1992).
150 As the dissent states, "[that) the issue was raised in a different case is an adequate
substitute for raising it in this case." Id. at 1746 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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1. The Supreme Court Should Not Have Created This Expanded Rule
The Supreme Court's traditionally broad powers of review
should be sufficient for granting review of important issues. The
Court had already declined to grant certiorari in United States v.
Page.'5 ' Therefore, the Court should not in a later case review the
rule from that decision, unless the rule is directly challenged. The
government had a clear right to present such a challenge in Williams,
but it did not. Because it declined to oppose the Page rule, this rule
from an earlier decision should not have been reviewable in this
case.
Furthermore, resting the propriety of review in part upon the
distinction between a party that complies with a rule without ac-
knowledging its correctness 52 (review granted) and one which ac-
cepts a rule as correct and recognizes its obligations under that
rule 53 (review not granted) seems to be a weak semantic difference
on which to base this decision. Contrary to the Court's suggestion,
it is perhaps not "unreasonable" in an adversarial system to require
litigants to object to clearly applicable precedent in order to gain
review on that issue.15 4
2. The Court's Expanded Rule Unduly Favors the Government
The Court's rule for granting certiorari will disproportionately
favor the government, the court system's most frequent litigant.
Furthermore, such favorability does not hinge merely on the greater
number of cases in which the government is a party. Rather, such
an advantage depends on the likelihood that two recent cases in-
volving the same issue and litigant exist, and that one of the cases is
used a precedent by the other. The probability of this occurring
when the government is the party is therefore significantly greater
than the probability that any other litigant might benefit from the
rule.
This prejudice is easily illustrated. First, assume that there is a
current case, such as United States v. Williams, before a circuit court.
Also assume that in that circuit a certain procedural rule was re-
cently promulgated. Normally, both parties would have an equal
chance to benefit from the rule in any given case.
151 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987).
152 Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1740 (citing Brief for the United States in Response to Ap-
pellee's Brief at 9, United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1990) (Nos. 88-
2827, 88-2843) (language used by the Court to characterize the government's actions)).
153 Id. at 1747 n. 1 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (language used by the dissent to character-
ize the government's actions).
154 Id. at 1740.
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The situation changes, however, if a party may only employ that
rule if it was also a litigant in the earlier, precedential case. The
likelihood that a party can benefit from that rule then depends on
the number of recent cases in which that party has been a litigant.
The United States is a much larger entity than all other litigants in
the United States courts, and therefore a much greater likelihood
exists that it was a litigant in the earlier, precedential case. It follows
that, in a case such as United States v. Williams, the government will be
much more likely to benefit from that rule than the other, smaller
litigant.
A simple economic model demonstrates the government's dis-
proportionate advantage.
ASSUMPTIONS:
1. Two parties, A and B, are involved in a law suit.
2. A case pool of ten precedential cases exists. Party A was a party in
five of these cases, and party B was a party in one.
3. Two precedential rules, rules #1 and #2, apply to the current
case, A v. B. Both rules were decided in one of the cases in the case
pool.
4. Rule # 1 is a precedent from an earlier case which may be used by
any litigant, regardless of whether that litigant was a party in the ear-
lier, precedential case.
5. Rule #2 is a precedent from an earlier case which may be used
only by a litigant which was also a party in that earlier, precedential
case.
RESULTS:
1. Both parties have an equal, 1007 chance of employing rule #1. The rule
comes from a case in the case pool, and neither party has to have been
a party in the precedential case in order to employ that rule in the
current case, A v. B.
2. Party A is favored in the use of rule #2. There is a 50% chance that A
was a litigant in the precedential case which promulgated rule #2,
since A was a party in five of the ten cases.
However, there is only a 10% chance that B can use rule #2, since
B was only a party in one of the ten cases.
Because of its favorability to the government, the rule in Wil-
liams for granting review could have a significant, asymmetric impact
on the granting of certiorari. The government will have more op-
portunity to appeal to the Court for review. Other litigants, how-
ever, will be much less able to benefit from this rule. Therefore, the
dissent is correct in asserting that this rule treats the government as
a favored litigant.' 55
The ultimate impact of this new rule, however, depends upon
155 Id. at 1754 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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its usage by the Supreme Court. If the Court denies certiorari in
cases in which the government has this advantage, then the impact
will be small. Conversely, if it grants certiorari, its impact may be
significant, if the Court reverses previous lower court decisions as it
did in Page.
Yet even if the ultimate effect of the Court's new rule is negligi-
ble, the rule fails to maintain even an appearance of fairness. Two
basic tenets of the criminal justice system are that fair procedures
will be provided and that the appearance of fairness will be main-
tained in the application of these procedures. 156 The Supreme
Court has expressed these values as well in such statements as "jus-
tice must satisfy the appearance of justice" 157 and "our system of
law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfair-
ness."' 158 In a broad yet very important sense, these statements em-
phasize the importance of fairness-and the appearance of
fairness-in the criminal justice system. 159 Arguably, the rule in
Williams fails to maintain even the appearance of fairness by creating
the possibility of dissymmetry in grants of certiorari.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Williams, the Court reinforced the independent nature and
broad discretion of the grand jury. Citing the historical indepen-
dence of the grand jury and its role as an investigative and accusa-
tory body, the Court held that federal courts may not dismiss
indictments when the prosecution fails to present substantial excul-
patory evidence in its possession to the grand jury. In reaching this
conclusion, however, the Court ignored the grand jury's historical
role in protecting accused parties from wrongful indictment. The
added discretion given to the prosecution may lead to more poorly
informed grand juries that, because they are less informed, are less
accurate in determining probable cause.
The Court also expanded its rule for granting certiorari to al-
low for review of questions not pressed or passed upon below. The
Court held that certiorari is proper, even if the question on appeal
156 LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 7, § 1.6(g).
157 Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) (judge who is personally embroiled
with counsel throughout trial should not sit in contempt hearing against counsel, re-
gardless of ability to remain objective).
158 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) (judge sitting as state's "judge-grand
jury" may not preside over contempt hearing for witnesses who refused to testify before
him).
159 If confined only to the facts in Offutt and Murchison, however, these statements
stand for the narrower principal that no person should act as judge in a case in which
that person has a vested interest. See Offutt, 348 U.S. at 14; Murchison, 349 U.S. at 136.
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was not pressed or passed upon below, if the question was pressed
or passed upon in a precedential case in which the current appellant
was also a litigant. The appellant, however, must never have ac-
knowledged the propriety of this precedential rule. This expanded
rule may unduly favor the government and create dissymmetry of
review. Even if the expanded rule ultimately has little impact, how-
ever, this appearance of unfairness is an unwelcome addition to the
criminal justice process.
GREGORY W. BOWMAN
